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Abstract
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) are arti-
facts observed on a network or in an operat-
ing system that can be utilized to indicate a
computer intrusion and detect cyber-attacks in
an early stage. Thus, they exert an impor-
tant role in the field of cybersecurity. How-
ever, state-of-the-art IOCs detection systems
rely heavily on hand-crafted features with ex-
pert knowledge of cybersecurity, and require a
large amount of supervised training corpora to
train an IOC classifier. In this paper, we pro-
pose using a neural-based sequence labelling
model to identify IOCs automatically from re-
ports on cybersecurity without expert knowl-
edge of cybersecurity. Our work is the first to
apply an end-to-end sequence labelling to the
task in IOCs identification. By using an at-
tention mechanism and several token spelling
features, we find that the proposed model is
capable of identifying the low frequency IOCs
from long sentences contained in cybersecu-
rity reports. Experiments show that the pro-
posed model outperforms other sequence la-
belling models, achieving over 88% average
F1-score.
1 Introduction
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) are forensic arti-
facts that are used as signs when a system has been
compromised by an attacker or infected with a par-
ticular piece of malware. To be specific, IOCs are
composed of some combinations of virus signatures,
IPs, URLs or domain names of botnets, MD5 hashes
of attack files, etc. They are frequently described
in cybersecurity reports, much of which are written
in unstructured text, describing attack tactics, tech-
nique and procedures, and can be utilized for early
detection of future attack attempts by using intru-
sion detection systems and antivirus software. With
the rapid evolvement of cyber threats, the IOC data
are produced at a high volume and velocity every
day, which makes it increasingly hard for human
to gather and manage them. A number of systems
are proposed to help discover and gather malicious
information and IOCs from various types of data
sources (Zhu and Dumitras, 2016; Liao et al., 2016;
Husari et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2017; Kwon et al.,
2017; Zhu and Dumitras, 2018). However, most of
them identify IOCs by using human-crafted features
that heavily rely on specific language knowledge
such as dependency structure, and they often have to
be pre-defined by experts in the field of the cyberse-
curity. Furthermore, they need a large amount of an-
notated data used as the training data to train an IOC
classifier. Those training data are frequently diffi-
cult to be crowed-sourced, because non-experts can
hardly distinguish IOCs from those non-malicious
IPs or URLs. Thus, it is a time-consuming and labo-
rious task to construct such a system.
In this paper, we propose using an end-to-end
neural sequence labelling model to fully automate
the process of IOCs identification. Among the pre-
vious studies of the neural sequence labelling task,
Huang et al. .(2015) proposed using a sequence la-
belling model based on the bidirectional long short-
term memory (LSTM) (Hochreiter and Schmidhu-
ber, 1997) for the task of name entity recogni-
tion (NER). Chiu and Nichols (2016) and Lample
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et al. .(2016) proposed integrating LSTM encoders
with character embedding and the neural sequence
labelling model to achieve a state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on the task of NER. Besides, Dernoncourt et
al. (2017) and Jiang et al. (2017) proposed applying
the neural sequence labelling model to the task of
de-identification of medical records. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to apply an end-to-
end sequence labelling to the task of IOCs identifi-
cation in cybersecurity.
The proposed approach is on the basis of
an artificial neural networks (ANN) with bidi-
rectional LSTMs and Conditional Random Fields
(CRF) (Lafferty et al., 2001), which shows promis-
ing results for named entity recognition (Lample et
al., 2016; Dernoncourt et al., 2017). Considering
that sentences of cybersecurity reports are different
from those news articles and patient notes, which al-
ways contain a large number of tokens, and some-
times lists of IOCs with little context, we make use
of an attention mechanism that helps LSTM to en-
code the input sequence accurately. We further in-
troduce several token spelling features to the ANN
model so that the proposed model can perform well
even with a very small amount of training corpora.
Based on the results of our experiments on En-
glish cybersecurity reports, our proposed approach
achieved an average precision of 90.4% and the re-
call of 87.2%.
2 Model
Figure 1 shows the components (layers) of the pro-
posed neural network architecture.
2.1 Input Embedding Layer
The input embedding layers takes a token as input
and outputs its vector representation. Similar to the
work of Lample et al. (2016), the output vector re-
sults from the concatenation of two different types
of embeddin: the first one directly maps a token to
a vector, while the second one outputs a character-
level token encoder.
As shown in Figure 1, given an input sequence
of tokens x1, . . . , xn, each token xi (i = 1, . . . , n)
is mapped to a token embedding Vt(xi) with the
mapping of token embedding Vt(·). The token em-
bedding is pre-trained on large unlabeled datasets,
and is learned jointly with the rest of the model.
Then, let xi,1, . . . , xi,l(i) be the sequence of char-
acters that comprise the token xi, where l(i) is the
number of characters in xi. Each character xi,j
(j = 1, . . . , l(i)) is mapped to a character embed-
ding Vc(xi,j) using the mapping of character em-
bedding Vc(·). The character embedding is ran-
domly initialized and also jointly learned during the
training process. Then the vector Vc(xi,j) is passed
to a bidirectional LSTM, which outputs a forward
character-based token embedding
−→
bi and a back-
ward embedding
←−
bi . Finally, the output ei of the
input embedding layer for the ith token xi is the con-
catenation of the token embedding Vt(xi) and the
character-based token embeddings
−→
bi,
←−
bi.
2.2 Token LSTM Layer
The token LSTM layer takes the sequence of em-
beddings ei (i = 1, . . . , n) as input, and outputs a
sequence pi(i = 1, . . . , n), where the tth element of
pi represents the probability that the ith token has
the label t.
Different from the previous work of name entity
recognition in news articles or patient notes, sen-
tences from a cybersecurity report often contain a
large number of tokens as well as lists of IOCs
with little context, making it much more difficult for
LSTM to encode the input sentence correctly. Con-
sidering that tokens cannot contribute equally to the
representation of the input sequence, we introduce
an attention mechanism to extract such tokens that
are crucial to the meaning of the sentence. Then,
we aggregate the representation of those informative
words to form the vector of the input sequence. The
attention mechanism is similar to the one proposed
by Yang et al. (2016), which is defined as follows:
ui = tanh(Wwhi + bw)
αi =
exp(u>i uw)∑
i exp(u
>
i uw)
s =
∑
i
αihi
That is to say, we first compute the ui as a hidden
representation of the hidden states of LSTM hi for
ith input token, i.e., hi = [
−→
h i;
←−
h i]. Then, we mea-
sure the importance of the ith token with a trainable
vector uw and get a normalized importance weight
Figure 1: ANN model of sequence labeling for IOCs automatic identification
αi through a softmax function. After that, the sen-
tence vector s is computed as a weight sum of hi
(i = 1, . . . , n). Here, weight matrix Ww, bias bw
and vector uw are randomly initialized and jointly
learned during the training process. Noted that each
input sentence merely has one sentence vector s as
its weighted representation, and s is then used as a
part of each output oi (i = 1, . . . , n).
Furthermore, we introduce some spelling features
to defined IOCs to improve the performance of the
proposed model on a very small amount of training
data. Here we define several token spelling features
and map each token xi (x = 1, . . . , n) to a vector
feature(xi), where the qth element of feature(xi)
represents the value of the qth feature of token xi.
Noted that the hand-crafted token spelling features
are only applied to initialization, and values of fea-
tures are jointly learning during the process of train-
ing.
As shown in Figure 1, the vector oi (i = 1, . . . , n)
is a concatenation of the ith LSTM hidden states
hi, the sentence vector v and the feature vector
feature(xi). Each vector oi is then given to a
feed-forward neural network with one hidden layer,
which outputs the corresponding probability vector
pi.
2.3 CRF Layer
We also introduce a CRF layer to output the most
likely sequence of predicted labels. The score of a
label sequence yi(i = 1, . . . , n) is defined as the
sum of the probabilities of unigram labels and the
Table 1: Statistics of datasets
training validation set test set
attacker 5,304 1,067 1,609
attack method 2,737 610 882
attack target 3,055 1,055 695
domain 6,443 1,054 1,701
e-mail address 1,284 154 222
file hash 10,367 2,055 2,459
file information 4,353 1,024 1,131
IPv4 3,012 729 819
malware 7,317 1,585 1,974
URL 1,849 105 156
vulnerability 1,557 309 359
tokens 1,169,896 253,336 350,406
paragraphs 6,702 1,453 2,110
articles 250 70 70
bigram label transition probabilities:
s(y) =
n∑
i=1
pi[yi] +
n∑
i=2
T [yy−1, yy]
where T is a matrix that contains the transition prob-
abilities of two subsequent labels. Vectors pi is the
output of the token LSTM layer, and T [g, h] is the
probability that a token with label g is followed by
a token with the label h. Subsequently, these scores
are turned into probabilities of the label sequence by
taking a softmax function over all possible label se-
quences.
3 Evaluation
3.1 Datasets
As English data, we crawled 687 cybersecurity arti-
cles from a collection of advanced persistent threats
(APT) reports which are published from 2008 to
20181. All of those cybersecurity articles are used
to train the word embedding. Afterwards, we ran-
domly selected 370 articles, and manually annotate
the IOCs contained in the articles. Among the se-
lected articles, we randomly select 70 articles as the
validation set and 70 articles as the test set; the re-
maining articles are used for the training set. Table 1
shows statistics of the datasets. The output labels are
1 https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_Cy
berCriminal_Campagin_Collections
annotated with the BIO (which stands for “Begin”,
“Inside” and “Outside”) scheme.
3.2 Token Spelling Features
Table 2 lists all the spelling features for a given to-
ken.
Values of features are then formed as a vector, and
are concatenated with the LSTM hidden state vec-
tor and the sentence vector of attention in the token
LSTM layer2 as shown in Section 2.2.
3.3 Training Details
For pre-trained token embedding, we apply
word2vec (Mikolov et al., 2013) to all crawled
687 English APT reports described in Section 3.1
using a window size of 8, a minimum vocabulary
count of 1, and 15 iterations. The negative sampling
2 We concatenate the feature vector at different locations in
the proposed model, i.e., the input of the token LSTM layer
(ei = [Vt(xi);
−→
bi;
←−
bi; feature(xi)]), the hidden state of the
token LSTM (hi; = [
−→
h i;
←−
h i; feature(xi)]), and the output of
token LSTM (oi = [hi; s; feature(xi)]). Among them the
third alternative achieved the best performance. We speculate
that spelling features played an important role in the task of
IOCs identification and feature vectors near the output layer was
able to improve the performance more significantly than those
at other locations.
3http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by
-domain.txt
4https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securit
y/portal/mmpc/shared/malwarenaming.aspx
Table 2: token spelling features
features definition
IPv4 feature Return 1 when the token contains 4 digits (<256) and maybe a digit as
the port.
domain feature Return 1 when the token has an identified top-level domain3.
hash feature Return 1 when the token is a hexadecimal string with the length of 32,
40 or 64.
URL feature Return 1 when the token matches a regular expression
http(s)?:\\[0-9a-zA-Z_\.\-\\]+.
vulnerability feature Return 1 when the token matches a regular expression
CVE-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4,6}.
file information feature Return 1 when the token matches a regular expression
[a-zA-Z]{1}:\\[0-9a-zA-Z_\.\-\\]+
e-mail address feature Return 1 when the token contains a string that matches a regular expres-
sion [0-9a-zA-Z_\.\-]+, the “@” and a domain.
malware feature Return 1 when the token starts with the malware type, and contains the
common delimiter4.
other features Return 1 when the token contains digits.
Return 1 when the token merely consists of digits.
Return 1 when the token contains alphabets.
Return 1 when the token merely consists of alphabets.
Return 1 when the token contains both digits and alphabets.
Return 1 when the token merely consists of digits and alphabets.
Return 1 when the token contains “.” and return the number of “.” con-
tained.
Return 1 when the token contains “\” and return the number of “\”
contained.
Return 1 when the token contains “@” and return the number of “@”
contained.
Return 1 when the token contains “:” and return the number of “:” con-
tained.
number of word2vec is set to 8 and the model type
is skip-gram. The dimension of the output token
embedding is set to 100.
The ANN model is trained with the stochastic
gradient descent to update all parameters, i.e., to-
ken embedding, character embedding, parameters
of bidirectional LSTMs, weights of attention, token
features, and transition probabilities of CRF layers
at each gradient step. For regularization, the dropout
is applied to the character-enhanced token embed-
ding before the token LSTM layer. Further training
details are given below: (a) Dimensions of character
embedding, hidden states of character-based token
embedding LSTM, and hidden states of label predic-
tion LSTM are set to 25, 25, and 100, respectively.
(b) All of the LSTMs parameters are initialized with
a uniform distribution ranging from -1 to 1. (c) We
train our model with a fixed learning rate of 0.005.
We compute the average F1-score of the validation
set by the use of the currently produced model after
every epoch had been trained, and stop the training
process when the average F1-score of validation set
fails to increase during the last ten epochs. We train
our model for, if we do not early stop the training
process, 100 epochs as the maximum number. (d)
We rescale the normalized gradient to ensure that its
norm does not exceed 5. (e) The dropout probability
is set to 5.
Table 3: evaluation results (micro average for 11 labels)
Models Precision Recall F1-score
Baseline 47.1 58.8 52.3
Huang et al. (2015) 64.8 33.6 51.6
Lample et al. (2016) 83.0 75.2 78.9
Rei et al. (2016) 81.6 74.5 77.9
Our model 90.4 87.2 88.8
Table 4: evaluation results for each labels (Precision / Recall / F1-score)
Lample et al. (2016) Our model Our model without
additional features
attacker 89.2 / 66.5 / 78.1 94.7 / 73.6 / 82.8 94.2 / 70.6 / 80.7
attack method 78.0 / 67.7 / 74.8 72.5 / 92.0 / 91.1 93.2 / 85.8 / 89.3
attack target 81.2 / 66.5 / 76.1 90.2 / 87.8 / 89.0 88.6 / 86.4 / 87.5
domain 67.0 / 64.3 / 65.6 91.2 / 95.3 / 93.2 82.9 / 61.3 / 70.5
e-mail address 63.8 / 20.7 / 31.3 93.8 / 92.5 / 93.2 83.3 / 40.3 / 54.3
file hash 85.9 / 97.7 / 91.4 88.3 / 99.9 / 93.7 89.0 / 98.5 / 93.5
file information 72.4 / 67.7 / 70.0 78.7 / 80.2 / 79.4 83.3 / 58.9 / 69.0
IPv4 77.6 / 76.1 / 76.9 83.7 / 96.3 / 89.6 83.6 / 95.2 / 89.0
malware 74.4 / 61.4 / 67.2 95.6 / 56.9 / 71.3 85.6 / 56.0 / 67.7
URL 98.2 / 94.1 / 96.1 99.2 / 94.1 / 96.6 98.2 / 93.1 / 95.6
vulnerability 87.7 / 88.9 / 88.3 95.5 / 95.5 / 95.5 95.3 / 94.1 / 94.7
micro average 83.0 / 75.2 / 78.9 90.4 / 87.2 / 88.8 90.0 / 78.8 / 84.0
We train the ANN model on the training set. The
training time is around 10 hours when using the de-
scribed parameters on an 8-CPU machine.
3.4 Results
As shown in Table 3, we report the micro average
of precision, recall and F1-score for all 11 types of
labels for a baseline as well as the proposed model.
As the baseline, we simply judge the input token as
IOCs on the basis of the spelling features described
in Section 3.25 . As presented in Table 3, the score
obtained by the proposed model is clearly higher
than the baseline.
Furthermore, we quantitatively compare our study
with other works of name entity recognition, i.e., the
work of Huang et al. (2015), the work of Lample et
al. (2016) and the work of Rei et al. (2016). We
train these models by employing the same training
5 For types of “attacker”, “attack method” and “attack tar-
get”, only tokens that appeared in the training set are identified
by the baseline.
Figure 2: Impact of the training set size on F1-score
set and training parameters as the proposed model.
As shown in Table 3, the proposed model obtains
the highest precision, recall and F1-score than other
NER models in the task of IOCs extraction. Com-
pared with the second-best model of Lample et
al. (2016), the performance gain of the proposed
model is approximately 7.4% of precision, 12.0% of
recall and 9.9% of the F1-score. Table 4 shows the
Table 5: Examples of correct identification by the proposed model
comparison of scores of each label between Lample
et al. (2016) and out proposed models. Based on
Table 4, the proposed model achieves better perfor-
mance for every label, which proves the effective-
ness of the proposed model.
To prove the effectiveness of the spelling features,
we further compare the proposed model with the
model without spelling features. As shown in Ta-
ble 4, the model with features obtains slightly lower
scores of precision for some types of labels, and ob-
viously higher scores of recall and F1-score for all
types of labels. This is mainly because parts of the
IOCs in the test set are newly introduced and appear
infrequently. Therefore, the model without spelling
features fails to identify those low frequency IOCs
for the lack of context information, while the pro-
posed model correctly identifies those IOCs using
spelling features as extra information. However,
model with hand-crafted spelling features may cause
more extraction of false positives, i.e., tokens that
have similar to IOCs but are not malicious. The
problem is expected to be solved by the introduc-
tion of some context features for IOCs tend to be de-
scribed in a simple and straightforward manner with
a fixed set of context tokens (Liao et al., 2016).
Moreover, Figure 2 shows the impact of the train-
ing set size on the performance of the models. When
the training set size is rather limited, the proposed
model achieves a greater improvement on F1-score
the Lample et al. (2016), since the proposed model
uses spelling features as extra information to iden-
tify IOCs that have little context information.
Table 5 compares several examples of correct IOC
extraction produced by the proposed model with one
by the work of Lample et al. (2016). In the first ex-
ample, the model of Lample et al. (2016) fails to
identify the malicious URL “http://www7.chrome-
up.date/0m5EE”, because the token only appears in
the test set and consists of several parts that are un-
common for URLs, such as “www7” and “date”,
and thus both the token embedding and the char-
acter embedding lack proper information to repre-
sent the token as a malicious URL. The proposed
model correctly identifies the URL, where the to-
ken is defined as a URL by spelling features and is
then identified as a malicious URL by the use of the
context information. In the second example, token
“MDDEFGEGETGIZ” is erroneously identified as
the name of a malicious file by the model of Lample
et al. (2016) because of the context “DLL’s config”
before the token that tends to co-occur with names
of files. The token is correctly identified by the pro-
posed model, because the token fails to match the
regular expression of file information, and is conse-
quently not considered as a name of a malicious file.
4 Related Work
NLP in cybersecurity Few references in cyber se-
curity utilize natural language processing. Neuhaus
and Zimmermann (2010) analyze the trend of vul-
nerability by applying latent Dirichlet allocation to
vulnerability description. Liao et al. (2016) put for-
ward a system to automatically extract IOC items
from blog posts. Husari et al. (2017) proposed a sys-
tem that automatically extracted threat actions from
unstructured threat intelligence reports by utilizing a
pre-defined ontology. A concurrent work by Zhu et
al. (2018) automatically extracted IOC data from se-
curity technical articles and further categorized them
into different stages of malicious campaigns. All
of those systems consist of several components that
rely heavily on manually defined rules, while our
proposed model is an end-to-end model using word
embedding and spelling features as input, which is
more general and applicable to a broader area.
Neural NER models There are amount of ANN-
based works in the area of named entity recogni-
tion. Collobert et al. (2001) described one of the
first task-independent neural tagging models on the
basis of convolutional neural networks. Hammer-
ton (2003) first proposed NER with LSTM. Huang
et al. (2015) proposed a bidirectional LSTM model
with a CRF layer, including hand-crafted features
specialized for the task of NER. Lample et al. (2016)
described a model where the character-level repre-
sentation was concatenated with word embedding
and Rei et al. (2016) improved the model by intro-
ducing an attention mechanism to the character-level
representations. Dernoncourt et al. (2017) proposed
applying the neural sequence labelling model to the
task of de-identification of medical records. One
appealing property of those works is that they can
achieve excellent performance with a unified archi-
tecture and without task-specific feature engineer-
ing. It remains unclear that whether such works can
be used for tasks without large amounts of training
data. Several works such as Yang et al. (2017) and
Lee et al. (2018) proposed applying transfer learning
to NER using a limited number of training corpora.
Nevertheless, a large dataset that has same labels
as the small training dataset is required for transfer
learning, which is hard to obtain in the field of cyber-
security. In this paper, we introduce several spelling
features which use no expert knowledge of cyberse-
curity to the neural model, and achieve an excellent
performance even using a small dataset for training.
5 Conclusions
To conclude, in this paper, we propose a neural
based sequence labelling model capable of iden-
tifying IOCs automatically from APT security re-
ports. Utilizing an attention mechanism and several
spelling features, we find that the proposed model
can correctly identify low frequency IOCs with a
small amount of training corpora. Based on the eval-
uation results of our experiments on English APT
reports, our proposed approach performs better than
other sequence labelling models with an average
precision of 90.4% and recall of 87.2%.
To avoid the problem caused by the spelling fea-
tures described in Section 3.4, one of our significant
future work is to integrate several context features.
Another important future work is to adapt the pro-
posed model to another new language. Even though
security articles are written in different languages,
most of the IOCs are written in English. Our prelim-
inary experiments demonstrate that models trained
with English texts can identify parts of IOCs from
a Chinese text using cross-lingual words embedding
obtained by the work of Duong el al (2016). It can
be a quick way to adapt the model to a new language
with minimal or no data, and the performance of the
proposed model is expected to be improved by ex-
tending the training dataset using multilingual cor-
pora.
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